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Abstract. This paper focuses on the operations involved in the digital forensic 
process using the requirements engineering framework KAOS.  The idea is to 
enforce the claim that a requirements engineering approach to digital forensics 
produces reusable patterns for future incidents.  Our patterns here will be opera-
tion-focused, rather than requirement-focused, which is simpler because the op-
erations can potentially be exhaustively enumerated and evaluated. Thus, for 
example, given the complexity of the Ceglia versus Zuckerberg Facebook case 
involving alleged document forgery, we can show that one of the benefits com-
ing out of the modelling exercise was the set of operations needed.  This will 
give an estimate for the future of what kind of capabilities and resources are 
needed for other complex document-forgery cases involving computers. It may 
also help to plan investigations and prioritise the use of resources more widely 
within the case workload of investigators. 
1 Introduction 
In recent years, there has been a significant and increasing problem with management 
and control of digital forensic investigations, especially involving capability and re-
source planning. It is very difficult to allocate sufficient resources when planning new 
investigations leading to significant delays and inefficiencies that have become rou-
tine with many units having backlogs greater than 1 year. This is due to the complexi-
ty of such investigations, increasing volumes of stored and transmitted data, the di-
verse types and number of devices and network sources being examined, and the 
number of investigations with significant involvement using computers and the Inter-
net.   
 
We need to move away from the insistence on investigating all potential evidence, 
and therefore we need a convincing explanation of our search strategy to justify its 
sufficiency. For example, Paul Ceglia provided 1087 CDs to Zuckerberg’s experts in 
his claim for 50% of Facebook [1]. This is the computer equivalent of supplying a 
truckload of boxes full of documents in legal discovery, where the relevant evidence 
is stapled between two unrelated pieces of evidence at the bottom of one of the boxes. 
 
This volume and complexity challenge has been identified in numerous works in the 
literature (e.g. [2,3,4]).  Therefore, providing an approach to discover the set of high-
level operations that will be needed for a specific investigation, based on prior experi-
ences with similar investigations, is becoming more and more urgent at both the plan-
ning and implementation stages. 
 
In this paper, we propose the use of the operational model of a goal-driven require-
ments engineering methodology called KAOS [5] in capturing the operations and 
resources needed during the various stages of a digital forensic investigation. The 
KAOS operational model provides a methodological platform for describing how 
concrete requirements of any system or process can be operationalised, and therefore 
provide an abstract specification for the operations or tools underlying them.  We 
show that such operationalisation can lead to the formulation of an operational pattern 
of an investigation for various types of cybercrimes. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we discuss related work.  
In Section 3, we describe how digital forensics processes used by forensic analysts 
and computer security personnel can be described as KAOS operations. We demon-
strate informally also how this leads to the notion of an operational pattern underlying 
a specific type of crime. In Section 4, we show how this approach works in a real case 
study involving Facebook [6,7].  Finally, in Section 5, we conclude the paper and 
discuss directions for future work. 
2 Related Work 
There is a growing set of work on triage as a way of managing resources more effec-
tively. The concept of triage is best known in medical emergencies, where triage is 
defined as: ‘A process for sorting injured people into groups based on their need for 
or likely benefit from immediate medical treatment’ [8]. Parsonage provides a good 
overview of the practical issues facing forensic investigators [9] when he explains 
how he successfully reduced the backlogs in his unit by several months.  The Cyber 
Forensic Field Triage Process Model (CFFTPM) [10] proposes an approach for rapid-
ly investigating digital evidence, which systematises their existing investigative 
methods into a defined forensic process.  
 
These models attempt to cast the triage process within the wider investigative process 
involving all stages, not just the initial survey. These works, along with a few others 
[11,12], help make the forensic process more efficient and effective by using tech-
niques that attempt to measure and repeat the success of previous investigations.  
 
These papers outline many practical issues that we address more formally with opera-
tionalisation. The idea of using the full-blown capabilities of requirements engineer-
ing methodologies, and in particular KAOS, as a new approach in capturing and for-
malising the requirements underlying digital forensic investigations is relatively new 
[6,7,13].  In [13], KAOS was shown to be a suitable methodology for modelling the 
various processes involved in digital forensic investigations. In [6], the work was 
further extended and a framework was introduced to express the requirements of the 
context as well as the investigation. In addition, obstacles and anti-goals were used to 
capture the notion of impediments to investigations, such as anti-forensic activities 
that aim to hide illicit activities.  Finally, in [7], the KAOS approach was applied in 
defining the requirements of a recent complex case of alleged document forgery in-
volving Facebook. 
3 Forensic Systems as KAOS Operations 
KAOS is a generic methodology based on capturing, structuring and precisely formu-
lating system goals [5].  KAOS is a goal-driven methodology consisting of several 
related models that aim to describe how and by whom the main set of goals underly-
ing a system will be satisfied.  In addition to its goal model that aims to formulate 
system goals, KAOS also incorporates models for the operationalisation of require-
ments (the operation model), the assignment of responsibility (the agent model) and 
the definition of risk (the obstacle and anti-goal models). 
 
In [13], an approach was defined describing how digital forensic investigations can 
benefit from KAOS models. We used the goal model to formulate system goals and 
gradually decompose them into relevant activities for the investigative process.  Think 
of goal models as a more systematic version of attack trees [14], where we progres-
sively decompose the investigative goals into individual steps that can be implement-
ed. The first stage is to decompose the identified goals into sub-goals and then sec-
ondly decompose the sub-goals into concrete requirements. Once the requirements 
have been discovered, it is possible to determine the operations that concretely im-
plement an investigation and allocate these activities to responsible agents.   
 
The implementation could include any of the operations at the planning, identifica-
tion, search, seizure, analysis, documentation and court presentation stages of an in-
vestigation.  Specifically, it would be relevant to the stages of an Equivocal Forensic 
Analysis (EFA) [15 Ch 7] representing the tools and techniques used to gather tem-
poral, functional and relational data pertaining to the evidence. 
 
A recent case involving alleged document forgery in Ceglia versus Zuckerberg and 
Facebook [7] was analysed, where the goals were systematically decomposed into a 
set of actionable requirements that could be executed by forensic experts. For exam-
ple, with document forgery some requirements for the discovery of document tamper-
ing and fraudulent communication are shown in the blue trapeziums of Figure 1. 
These can be operationalised using a number of tools/software/operations such as a 
document viewer, a metadata viewer, a system log viewer and an email viewer, as 
illustrated by the operations in circles of Figure 1.  
 
 
Fig. 1. The Operationalization of Requirements for the Discovery of Document Authenticity 
and Tampering (top half) and Fraudulent Communications (bottom half) [6] 
In addition, these activities needed to be allocated to responsible agents that are au-
thorised and competent to carry out the operations. Any problem with operationalisa-
tion and assignment may indicate issues with the investigation that require further 
planning, or even abandonment if the problems cannot be adequately addressed. 
 
Once a number of such operationalisation exercises have been carried out for a specif-
ic type of a crime, we can formulate an operational pattern, which means the set of 
all possible operations (systems, software, tools, services etc.) that can be involved 
within a digital forensic investigation into an instance of that crime.  This could lead 
to more effective and efficient implementation of investigative techniques and limit-
ing unpleasant surprises. There are also benefits for the investigative workload in 
general where new cases can be provisionally operationalised leading to decisions 
about case selection and resource provision early enough to address any issues. 
3.1 From KAOS Requirements to Operations 
We now provide a more precise definition of an operational pattern. We define the 
mapping from KAOS requirements to operations as a relation f: 
  (1) 
where R is the set of requirements models in KAOS and O is the set of KAOS opera-
tions, both of which are defined by users in some specific problem domain.  For the 
case of criminal investigations, we redefine this function as follows: 
  (2) 
where c is an identifier indicating a specific type of crime; for example, this could be 
identity fraud, cyber theft or document forgery. It is important to note the c is used in 
a general way here; however, in real world criminal investigations, c would be chosen 
more in a more fine-grained manner to reflect specific type of crimes, such as con-
tract forgery or invoice forgery as refinements of document forgery. 
4 Facebook Case Study 
We discuss the crime type of alleged document forgery in the Ceglia versus Zucker-
berg and Facebook case. Here we focus on the operations (forensic tools, techniques, 
operations and capabilities) used, and we produce two definitions, one for fFacebook 
and one for the operations involved, OFacebook, defined later.  
 
Mr Ceglia alleged that he had agreed a contract with Mark Zuckerberg to give him 
50% of Facebook, whereas Zuckerberg claimed the only contract between the pair did 
not mention Facebook and that Ceglia’s contract was a manipulated version of the 
agreed one. See the expert report for Zuckerberg [1] and a comprehensive goal mod-
elling analysis [7] for further details. 
 
Here, we focus on the how we meet the requirements of detect text changes, 
detect file metadata anomalies, detect system anomalies and search 
application data with suitable operations to demonstrate the allegation of for-
gery. We discuss later how to operationalise the requirements in the physical forensic 
science domain to achieve the same goal.  
 
fFacebook = { 
(detect text changes → [perform formatting checks, writing style 
analysis, content analysis]),  
(detect file metadata anomalies → [check file timestamps, search 
log records, check document usage]),  
(detect system anomalies → [check clock tampering, investigate 
filesystem changes, examine registry keys]),  
(find application evidence → [investigate email activity, 
discover social networking use, analyse Internet usage, search 
for hacking tools]) 
} 
 
In the above example, the requirements are operationalised by different operations 
with different properties regarding their applicability and potential benefits. Typically, 
in requirements engineering, we choose one or possibly more ways to operationalise 
the requirements. Here, we do not know a priori which operations are possible and 
most likely to be effective, and so we need to consider the context of the case to de-
termine the best method of operationalisation, so we suggest a number of operations 
to meet each requirement. 
 
The requirement of detect text changes is operationalised in the Ceglia case by 
perform formatting checks to search for formatting discrepancies, writing 
style analysis to find inconsistencies, and content analysis to search for 
anomalies. There was no “golden copy” of the contract lodged in a secure location or 
with a trusted party to compare with the alleged contract, which would often be the 
case with official business contracts. The formatting checks found several discrepan-
cies that Zuckerberg claimed were manipulated to squeeze in more text, but this is 
inconclusive as the contract was not a highly structured document with specified for-
matting. Next, the writing style can be internally inconsistent indicating multiple au-
thors, but here there were only minor changes between the two contracts.  Finally, the 
content can be ambiguous, conflicting or demonstrably bogus, but again this was not 
proven. 
 
The requirement of checking the contract for evidence of textual changes could be 
met by a combination of the various operations, none of which is sufficient alone. 
Invalidating a requirement is also a crucial investigative goal to avoid wasting re-
sources on fruitless investigation allowing attention to be focused elsewhere, or mak-
ing spurious claims that may fatally weaken a case. Refutation can occur by demon-
strating a fact that is inconsistent with a requirement, or by showing that no feasible 
operations can satisfy a requirement. 
 
In the Ceglia case, the results of checking the contract text and computer systems for 
anomalies using the various operations were suggestive of forgery but inconclusive. 
However, other requirements were operationalised more convincingly. The electronic 
contract had undergone multiple irregular alterations meeting the requirement of de-
tect file metadata anomalies by the operation check file timestamps 
that discovered highly anomalous timestamps in draft contracts found on Ceglia hard 
disk. In addition, the physical forensic checks of the paper contract persuasively 
showed deceptive manipulation (see later).  
 
Some operations do not satisfy primary requirements by themselves but suggest new 
requirements and possible operations. For example, an application level search opera-
tion investigate email activity found undisclosed email accounts used by 
Ceglia that eventually led to the contract he sent to his lawyer in 2004 agreeing with 
Zuckerberg’s version.  
 
We obtain a second instance of type document forgery from a synthetic case of a fake 
invoice by a financial controller that altered a legitimate invoice by increasing the 
invoice amount and changing the payee to their name. This could involve the follow-
ing, slightly different, definition of the function fDocumentForgery: 
 
fInvoiceForgery = { 
(detect text changes → [hash comparison, good copy comparison, 
perform formatting checks, find goods substitution, find 
financial irregularities]),  
(detect file metadata anomalies → [check file timestamps, search 
log records, check document usage]),  
(detect system changes → [check clock tampering, investigate 
filesystem changes, examine registry keys]),  
(find application evidence → [check invoice number, check 
invoice database, find unauthorised applications]) 
} 
 
In the faked invoice example, the requirement of detect text changes is opera-
tionalised using comparison with a known authentic document by good copy com-
parison or hash comparison. In this case, a securely stored trusted copy of the 
invoice can be checked manually against the fake, or the invoice may be hashed with 
the hash securely stored for later comparison, neither of which was possible with the 
alleged Facebook contract.  
. 
Next, invoice formatting is highly structured with each section possibly having a par-
ticular design, configuration and size, and stylised with the organisational heading and 
logo amongst other things. Any significant departure would be indicative of forgery, 
but here a legitimate invoice was altered by an insider and so appeared genuine.  
 
The operations can be decomposed by progressive refinement into more specific ac-
tivities that can be carried out by suitable agents. Content analysis here has been de-
composed into the more granular find goods substitution and find finan-
cial irregularities that are common operations to detect fraudulent invoices. 
For example, for financial irregularities, invoice items may be inconsistent with the 
price or the total may exceed the allowed authorisation limit. Enforcing database con-
straints and double entry bookkeeping are typical operations to help defeat or discover 
fraud. 
 
The file metadata and system checks are the same as for the contract, as low-level 
checks are fairly stereotypical. Whereas the system checks are similar to the Facebook 
case, the application checks are different to reflect the different deceptive activities 
performed. 
 
We can also decompose the investigation into various types of examination in differ-
ent forensic domains. In the Ceglia case, we consider the physical forensic analysis 
separate from the logical examination, as different operations are performed by dif-
ferent parties, although they are attempting to satisfy similar requirements.  
 
fFacebookPhysical = { 
(detect text changes → [check content alterations, good  copy 
comparison, check handwriting consistency, check signature, 
check figures)],  
(detect paper anomalies → [check paper age, check paper type, 
check paper thickness, check paper whiteness)],  
(detect mark anomalies → [check ink properties, compare with 
invoice template, check watermark, check letterhead, check for 
fingerprints)],  
(detect printer properties → check toner anomalies, check 
printer tracking data)] 
} 
 
As can be observed, there are both similar and different requirements for physical 
investigation compared with digital analysis. Physical checks can be operationalised 
with many different physical or chemical checks, so the given operations are only 
indicative of the checks that can be performed. 
 
The physical tests demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that Ceglia’s contract was 
created using a fake page 2 attached to the legitimate page 1 from the original con-
tract. This was demonstrated in multiple ways by physical forensic experts, especially 
LaPorte [16] who showed that different toners and inks were used on the two pages. 
4.1 Operational Patterns 
We define here an operational pattern to be the set of all KAOS operations corre-
sponding to a specific type of crime, as follows: 
  (3) 
This definition states that the set of operations, , corresponding to a particular 
crime type, c, is the union of all the operations that can be obtained from every in-
stance of a requirements model for that type of crime.  Intuitively, these are the opera-
tions resulting from all the models corresponding to a particular crime type.  We call 
the set  the operational pattern corresponding to the crime type c. 
 
Hence, for the example of document forgery above, we can identify the general opera-
tional pattern as: 
 
fDocumentForgery = { 
(detect text changes → [perform formatting checks, writing style 
analysis, content analysis, good copy comparison]),  
(detect file metadata anomalies → [check file timestamps, search 
log records, check document usage]),  
(detect system anomalies → [check clock tampering, investigate 
filesystem changes, examine registry keys]),  
(find application evidence → [investigate email activity, 
discover social networking use, analyse Internet usage, search 




This operational pattern includes all the operations involved in a forensic investiga-
tion of document forgery from all prior cases (based here only on two examples). This 
allows us to plan for the operations that may be successful in future similar cases. We 
do not incorporate the physical forensic checks discussed above, as these are outside 
the digital forensic boundary and are irrelevant to the digital forensics investigator. 
 
There is an issue where the operations are at different levels of abstraction. We can 
reduce an operational pattern to a more abstract form by combining several operations 
into one, more abstract operation, which could represent a higher-level system-based 
view of the operations. For example, in the Facebook case, it may be possible to 
group detect text changes physically, and detect text changes logi-
cally into one abstract called detect text changes. Here, we have defined the 
abstract form of the same operation split across forensic domains. 
 
We can also group operations that perform the same function in a different way. 
perform specific application checks is an abstraction of check invoice 
number and check invoice database needed in the invoice forgery case. find 
goods substitution, and find financial irregularities are subsumed by 
content analysis. hash comparison, and good copy comparison are subsumed 
by check document integrity. We see that it is possible to move up and down 
this abstraction hierarchy depending on the specific case requirements. 
 
Finally, we propose a table showing all these operations and their relationships. We 
can determine the different types of operations, their pre and postconditions, and their 
costs and benefits. In adopting such an approach, we can provide an idea of what 
operations are needed in similar cases in the future along with potential issues. The 
‘costs’ include wasted investigative effort and the benefits include suggesting alterna-
tive operations that may satisfy the same requirement. Preconditions include the re-
sources and skills needed to carry out the operation and postconditions include the 
results needed to satisfy the requirement. 
 
5 Conclusion 
This work presented an approach demonstrating how the mapping from requirements 
underlying a digital forensic investigation to possible operations can lead to the notion 
of an operational pattern in specific types of crime.  Operationalisation leads to the 
creation of evidence (or its absence) that may lead to requirements satisfaction (or 
failure) eventually closing the loop to goal fulfilment (or not).  
 
Operationalisation helps us investigate the adequacy of different operations and po-
tential technical and legal issues that may arise. One of the main advantages is that it 
allows for the possibility of determining in advance, because of previous experience 
with similar crimes, the set of high value operations that might be involved in an in-
vestigation. This could be used to aid triage in the selection and prioritisation of tasks, 
and the determination whether to discontinue the case if some of the key tasks cannot 
be executed adequately or at all. 
 
We should consider the continuous evolution of technology, which inevitably will 
introduce new criminal tools and techniques that will undermine existing operational 
patterns.  This implies constant revision of such patterns, but having a high level of 
abstraction may help to understand the investigation conceptually and aid the discov-
ery of solutions tot these impediments. 
 
The examples demonstrated the practical use of operationalisation in a limited sense. 
We have some different operations for the contract and invoice forgery cases, but we 
need to study many more cases of document forgery to discover additional operations 
and establish well-defined criteria for their classification and determination of the 
abstraction and refinement hierarchy.  
 
It is clearly useful to determine the set of operations that may be available before 
investigation, but we may also need other features of KAOS such as behavioural and 
agent models for a more complete and constructive analysis. Further work will inves-
tigate the context where some operations are to be preferred over others depending 
upon the goals, resources, initial evidence and surrounding circumstances.  
 
Finally, formalisation is possible in simple scenarios using the LTL semantics under-
lying KAOS. However, we may have to focus on specific aspects of forgery to obtain 
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